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The State, 
decision-making 
and planning in 
Latin America 
Carlos A. de Mattos* 
In the first half of the 1960s, a planning orientation 
began to develop in Latin America which came into 
extensive use in a number of the countries in the 
region. The author contends that because of this 
orientation's Utopian voluntarism, economistic 
reductionism and formalism, it was not really very 
useful for public policy management and its impact 
on actual decision-making in these countries was 
generally very limited. However, independently of 
these experiences to a great extent, national 
decision-making processes were developed in var-
ious countries of the region as a function of the 
political schemes supported by the dominant social 
groups in these societies which can be regarded as 
genuine examples of capitalist planning. 
The author asserts that planning will indeed be 
necessary in the future for the Latin American coun-
tries and discusses what type of planning would be 
viable in complex capitalist social formations. In this 
regard, he examines what the minimum conditions 
for successful planning in this type of capitalist sys-
tem might be; the factors considered in this connec-
tion include the impact of these systems' dominant 
rationality, the weight carried by the ideology of 
dominant social groups and their respective political 
schemes, the State bureaucracy's attitude to them, 
and the limitations of existing social theories as a 
basis for decision-making and social action. 
The article concludes with a discussion of the 
possible modalities of planning in countries having 
the characteristics which predominate in Latin 
America. 
•Director of the ILPES Training Programme. A preli-
minary version of this article was prepared for presentation 
at the international seminar entitled "O Estado e o Planeja-
mento: os Sonhos e a Realidade" held at Brasilia from 16 to 
19 September 1986 in commemoration of the twentieth 
anniversary of the Training Centre for Economic Develop-
ment (CENDEC). The version presented here has been 
enriched by the valuable comments which the author 
received from Paulo Roberto Haddad, Roberto Pereira 
Guimaraes and Hector Pistonessi. 
"...any intervention in complex social structures 
has unforeseeable consequences, and reform pro-
cesses can only be defended in so far as they are 
based on exacting processes of trial and error 
which are carefully monitored by those who will 
have to bear the consequences". 
Jürgen Habermas (1985) 
Introduction 
An analysis of the period that unfolded under the 
influence of the Alliance for Progress seems an 
appropriate starting point for the presentation 
of some observations concerning the subject of 
planning in Latin America, inasmuch as this was 
the period that saw the establishment of the 
main features that shaped a Latin American con-
cept or modality of planning which then took 
hold and which even today continues to influ-
ence much of what is said and done in this field. 
Although there were certainly instances of 
planning, conceived as such, in Latin America 
prior to this period (such as, for example, the 
planning conducted during the first two Perón 
administrations in Argentina,during the time of 
Kubitschek in Brazil, during the first National 
Liberation governments in Costa Rica, etc.), 
what is of primary interest here are the factors 
which actually defined and crystallized the Latin 
American planning orthodoxy whose develop-
ment —at both its theoretical and practical 
levels— principally began in the early 1960s. 
Until that time, the word "planning" gener-
ally had a connotation of something undesirable 
in the vocabulary of many governmental circles 
in Latin America; even the frequently used 
euphemism of "programming" did not totally 
eliminate this connotation. The main reason for 
this was that the word "planning" was com-
monly associated at the time with, on the one 
hand, the methods and procedures being used to 
build socialism in the Soviet Union during the 
early years of the Stalinist period —a process 
which was viewed with widespread aversion by 
most Latin American governments— and, on 
the other hand, with interventionist, dirigiste or 
protectionist strategies, all of which were highly 
controversial and largely unaccepted during this 
period. 
Around I960 this situation underwent a 
radical change; the conference held by the Latin 
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American countries at Punta del Este in 1961 
and the consequent creation of the Alliance for 
Progress helped to bring about a decisive and 
singular formal legitimization of the term "plan-
ning" and even of the planner's trade, at least as 
they were understood at the time. This was a 
consequence, firstly, of the fact that in the final 
documents issued at the meeting, the countries 
recognized the need to formulate and execute 
national plans and, secondly, of the fact that the 
Alliance for Progress, as a mechanism for finan-
cial co-operation with the Latin American coun-
tries, made it a requirement that they should 
have economic and social development plans in 
order to qualify for such financing. 
This was the setting in which a certain view 
of planning made its appearance, developed and 
became consolidated which, since that time, has 
had a decisive influence on most of what has 
been said and done in this respect. It is perhaps 
important to stress that in the Latin American 
circles directly associated with the subject of 
planning, this concept was accepted virtually 
without debate and that it developed within a 
curious environment of intellectual isolation; 
indeed, even as a stimulating discussion of the 
Three principal closely interrelated features will 
be examined in an attempt to describe and ana-
lyse the planning modality that came into vogue 
in most of the Latin American countries at the 
time of the Alliance for Progress. Firstly, there 
was a certain Utopian voluntarism which was 
primarily manifested in the proposed orienta-
tion and content of the plans and which, in 
essence, was an outgrowth of the planners' ideol-
ogy. Secondly, there was an excessive economis-
ts reductionism deriving from an attempt to 
circumscribe the observation, description and 
explanation of social processes within the 
framework of economic theory so that, on this 
basis, policies might be designed for managing 
these processes. Thirdly, a pronounced formal-
role and alternative modalities of planning was 
taking place in other parts of the world —a 
dialogue which included an in-depth questioning 
of the concept that was adopted in Latin 
America— this debate was inexplicably ignored 
by many of the Latin American planners of the 
time. 
So it was that a true Latin American orthod-
oxy of planning came to be established which, 
for a relatively long period of time thereafter, 
was the only approach to the work at hand that 
was accepted as valid. When this concept clearly 
proved to be inoperable in practical terms, the 
most frequent response was to relegate the cor-
responding assessments to the context of a gen-
erally insignificant discussion of the so-called 
"planning crisis", which tended to sidestep the 
analysis of those factors that had the most to do 
with the lackluster results it had produced. 
An analysis of the main features or charac-
teristics of this traditional modality of planning 
will lay the groundwork for the formulation of 
some hypotheses as to the reasons for the failure 
of the undertakings which were based on the 
above concept. 
ism marked the procedures that were recom-
mended and adopted which was viewed as 
essential to the correct execution of planning 
tasks. 
The Utopian voluntarism attributed to the 
traditional form of Latin American planning 
was a consequence of the fact that planners 
tended to put their ideology before that of the 
social group which had effective control over 
decision-making. Basically, this meant that the 
orientation and content of the plans that were 
'The gestation and development, as well as the practical 
results, of this concept of planning in Latin America was explored 
in greater depth in an earlier article (de Mattos, 1979). 
I 
The main features of the Latin American 
planning orthodoxy1 
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designed during this stage conformed to the 
aspirations and interests of the planners them-
selves more than to those of the decision-
makers. This orientation and content fit in with 
the normative model that had been adopted, 
which served as the foundation for most of the 
plans produced during the period in question; in 
essence, this was a structuralist (or developmen-
talist) model which, having originally been out-
lined by ECLAC, was later adopted and carried 
forward by the Punta del Este Charter. This 
document —which was to play a fundamental 
role in the development of the traditional con-
cept of Latin American planning— while includ-
ing a specific enumeration of the central 
elements of the model, recommended its adop-
tion in the belief that its implementation would 
provide the best means of overcoming the main 
problems facing the countries of the region. 
Latin American planning was long marked 
by this early association; an assessment, pre-
pared early on, in 1965, of the experience which 
followed along the lines of this concept recog-
nized this in stating that "in the case of Latin 
America, planning has come to be regarded as 
the fundamental instrument for overcoming 
underdevelopment, a transition which entails 
far-reaching institutional and economic structu-
ral changes" (ILPES, 1966, p. 13). Within this 
context, the tendency since then in Latin Amer-
ica has been to identify planning with develop-
ment planning and, at the same time, to 
associate the concept of development with the 
orientation and content of the structuralist 
model referred to above. 
Within the framework of this concept, the 
figure of the planner tended to be idealized as an 
agent of social change and was assumed to have a 
measure of autonomy to act in this regard. The 
voluminous literature generated during this 
period bears witness to the fact that even 
planners tended to see themselves in this role 
and to believe that their work could actually lead 
to the sweeping changes they felt were necessary 
in Latin America. 
So it was that, under the influence of this 
concept of planning, there was a tendency to 
forget that decisions concerning the orientation 
and content of real planning processes are inde-
pendent of the planners' ideology, except in 
those cases where they are also decision-makers. 
Obviously, the idealization which this entailed 
stemmed from an abstract analysis that tended 
to overlook the historical and structural factors 
influencing real decision-making processes and, 
particularly, the role played by the interests and 
ideology of the social groups taking part in them. 
Thus, there was an inclination to ignore the fact 
that the orientation and basic content of any real 
process of national planning are always influ-
enced by the ideology of the dominant social 
groups and serve the interests of that ideology, 
which, ultimately, is expressed through the deci-
sions taken by the various institutions of the 
State. In this context, planning experts or tech-
nicians, when they actually do plan, do so as a 
function of the prevailing political scheme and, 
hence, of the ideology of those who have effec-
tive control over decision-making. As stated by 
Octavio Ianni, "...planning is a process that beg-
ins and ends within the sphere of power rela-
tions and structures" (O. Ianni, 1971, p. 300). In 
other words, planning is an essentially political 
activity designed to give direction and consis-
tency to a specific social process based on the 
normative orientations of the dominant classes 
at that point in time. 
These considerations lead directly into the 
analysis of the second feature of traditional Latin 
American planning, i.e., its economists reduc-
tionism, whose presence may be inferred from 
the fact that national systems tended to be 
observed, described and explained almost exclu-
sively with reference to their economic dimen-
sion and that it was thought that their 
management could and should be undertaken 
primarily through the use of economic policy 
tools.2 It should therefore come as no surprise 
that many of the definitions of planning com-
monly in use at the time were, in essence, defini-
tions of economic planning only. 
With this limited theoretical foundation, 
the diagnostic evaluations of the national situa-
tions for which the plans were intended often 
confined their analyses of resource shortages to 
the consideration of only those factors stressed 
by economic theory; this resulted in a failure to 
2In most of his more recent works, in presenting and justify-
ing his proposal concerning situational strategic planning, Carlos 
Mains has stressed the limitations of economic categories and the 
need to work on the basis of an all-encompassing category which 
would permit the dynamics of a complex system to be compre-
hended in all ¡ts variety (see, in particular, Matus, 1985). 
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look into the question of how specific processes 
were affected by the scarcity of such resources as 
political capacity, know-how, information, etc. It 
was thus impossible, within this context, to 
observe or consider the importance of those 
problems which Habermas (Habermas, 1973) 
characterized as a "legitimacy gap" or to evaluate 
their impact on the possible scope of national 
decision-making processes. Therefore, only a 
partial and unsatisfactory understanding could 
be gained of the functioning, in all its complex-
ity, of each national system, and this foredoomed 
any attempt to guide social processes effectively 
on the basis of the decisions and actions deriving 
from this type of planning. 
The economistic focus of planning was 
founded on the conviction that it was possible to 
manage economic variables on a rational basis by 
using economic policy tools to reproduce pro-
jected behaviour in real situations and, by this 
means, to achieve the complete fulfilment of 
established objectives. The assumptions under-
lying this reductionism resulted in a failure to 
take into account the implications and magni-
tude of the social conflict which arose out of the 
dispersion, in terms of both ideology and power, 
characterizing the socio-political situation in 
these countries. Consequently, the turbulence 
and uncertainty typical of the dynamics of peri-
pheral social systems were never fully compre-
hended and, therefore , the i r possible 
management fell outside the scope of action 
attributed to planning. 
As part of this peculiar way of observing 
and explaining the dynamics of national sys-
tems, there was an equally peculiar perception of 
the social actors which played a major part in 
determining the orientation and content of spe-
cific social processes. The absence, or superficial-
ity, of analyses of real decision-making processes 
made it possible to assume, without a great deal 
of debate on the subject, the effective existence 
of the social actors needed to implement the 
normative guidelines that had been proposed, it 
also being assumed that they possessed the 
necessary attributes to do so. 
This manner of perceiving social actors is 
particularly important in so far as it related to 
the State. In a major work on the subject, 
Gurrieri analysed the concept of the State 
underlying the thinking expressed by ECLAC, 
asserting that "the State has always been dealt 
with in a somewhat paradoxical manner in the 
writings of ECLAC: it is regarded as a decisive 
agent in the formulation and application of 
development strategies, but its true, changeable, 
nature is not analysed in depth. This paradox has 
been resolved by assuming the existence of an 
ideal planning and reformist State which would 
fully perform the function assigned to it" 
(Gurrieri, 1984, p. i). The same author went on 
to say that "this largely implicit image which 
ECLAC had of the State" comprised "the attrib-
utes of internal unity and consistency, autonomy 
from other economic agents, political and eco-
nomic supremacy, technical and administrative 
capacity, and control over external economic 
relations. These features constituted the core of 
the ideal State-as-planner, whose supposed 
existence permitted the evasion of a direct and 
systematic treatment of the political problems of 
development" (idem, p. ii). This was the concept 
of the State adopted by the traditional school of 
Latin American planning and was what allowed 
it, for quite some time, to formulate plans with-
out considering the impact of the ideology held 
by the groups in power; in other words, by virtue 
of the economistic reductionism on which it 
rested, this type of planning based many of its 
analyses on an image of the State which was 
fictitious, but which was a functional part of the 
orientation and content of the plans that were 
produced. Furthermore, without the support of 
these assumptions, it would have been difficult 
to sustain the image of the planner and of plan-
ning as serving to further social change. 
This concept of social actors and, in particu-
lar, of the State also stemmed from a form of 
analysis which shied away from considering the 
social and political factors influencing real pro-
cesses; from this perspective, it was impossible 
to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and 
role of the State in the capitalist social forma-
tions of Latin America or to comprehend the 
motivations of the actors controlling the respec-
tive decision-making processes. The image of 
the State as "a battlefield between centres of 
State and private power, each with their own 
orientations and rationalities, which struggle to 
impose their own interests" (Gurrieri, 1984, 
p. ii), was never clearly perceived in the plan-
ning analyses of this period. The view of the 
State as a manifestation of a pact of domination 
supported by a network of alliances among var-
ious social groups striving to preserve the 
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respective social formation's cohesiveness in the 
name of a supposed general interest never fig-
ured in these analyses; this omission lessened 
the possibility of arriving at a better understand-
ing of the main factors which affected the 
decision-making processes governed by the State 
and, in consequence, hindered progress towards 
a more realistic delimitation of what was actually 
viable as regards planning activities. 
In the final analysis, the Utopian volunta-
rism and economistic reductionism of the 
orthodox approach to planning in Latin America 
impeded and in-depth analysis of the political 
viability of the normative guidelines set forth in 
these plans; this was because the lack of knowl-
edge about the nature of actual decision-making 
processes made it impossible to identify the lim-
its of possibility which, in each specific case, 
placed constraints on these processes and on any 
policies arising out of them. Thus, planning 
made its appearance in the Latin American 
countries in a mythicized form, surrounded by a 
messianic aura which, in the end, caused it to be 
seen as Utopian. As a result, regard for the very 
idea of planning began to decline, especially in 
the political arena. 
The third feature was the formalism which 
prevailed during the period and which survives 
even today in planning as it is practised in some 
countries in the region; this feature marked both 
the procedures that were adopted and the insti-
tutional organization for directing the respective 
processes whose establishment or reinforce-
ment was recommended. 
With respect to planning procedures, a cer-
tain method of work came into general use 
which was basically inspired by the "stage-by-
stage planning" originally proposed and deve-
loped by Tinbergen. The procedure adopted was 
based on a sequence of tasks which, in essence, 
involved preparing a diagnostic analysis, setting 
objectives and goals, forecasting the behaviour 
of economic variables, designing policies, and 
identifying and formulating programmes and 
projects. This process culminated in the prepa-
ration of a comprehensive economic plan which 
was regarded as providing the indispensable 
articulation and guidance for the process that 
was to be initiated. 
Basically, this type of document —whose 
more distant antecedents were the procedures 
developed and used by Soviet planning in the 
late 1920s— was produced by the technical 
teams of certain bodies created especially for this 
purpose. The resulting comprehensive eco-
nomic plan, which had characteristics of a book-
plan, was prepared entirely on an ex ante basis 
and referred to the economic system as a whole. 
It usually had a detailed quantitative content 
based on an itemized identification of the behav-
iour of a set of macroeconomic variables over a 
medium-term planning horizon. In its turn, this 
identification had been carried out with an eye to 
the fulfilment of established objectives, which 
frequently revolved around growth targets for 
the product. This mode of work was founded on 
the belief that it was possible to imprint the 
behaviour ascribed by the plan upon the eco-
nomic system and this, in turn, involved the 
assumption that such behaviour wold continue 
and remain valid throughout the established 
planning horizon. This also entailed an addi-
tional, implicit assumption that a considerable 
degree of national autonomy and internal stabil-
ity existed within the system, all of which is 
difficult to accept, especially in the case of a 
peripheral social formation. 
In practice, these procedures were quickly 
seen to be ill-suited to the dynamics of these 
systems' social processes; the excessive detail 
and rigidity of these plans invariably resulted in 
their rapid obsolescence; in fact, this occurred so 
rapidly that, in most cases, they had already 
become outdated by the time they were pub-
lished because their projections were already 
seen to be entirely lacking in validity by that 
time. In other words, because of its excessive 
inflexibility, the book-plan proved to be an inap-
propriate tool for dealing with the situations of 
uncertainty and social turmoil characteristic of 
the Latin American countries. 
Furthermore, some of tne basic characteris-
tics of these plans helped to reinforce plannings 
loss of prestige in that, since the plans lay down 
an array of rigid commitments in regard to the 
projected behaviour of a set of variables 
—behaviour which, even before the fact, could 
be seen to be unachievable— many of them were 
judged to be incapable of doing what they had 
promised to do. 
The second aspect of the formalism dis-
played by traditional planning in Latin America 
relates to the basic proposal that was made in 
regard to the institutional machinery for the 
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production of such plans, i.e., the establishment 
of central planning bodies. This type of institu-
tional arrangement also had its more remote 
antecedents in those which had been used in 
Soviet planning —from which, ultimately, it had 
been copied. It should be pointed out, however, 
that in the Soviet case, the existence of a central 
national planning office which, on the basis of a 
set of indices and indicators set forth in a com-
prehensive plan, could orient and direct the 
planning process was a logical response to the 
needs of a system in which the indicators pro-
vided by market prices had been suppressed. 
Immediately after the Second World War, a 
number of Western European countries had 
adopted analogous institutional procedures 
involving the creation, under a variety of names, 
of their own central planning bodies. Under the 
particular conditions of relative stability and 
consensus which reigned for a short time in 
these countries, such central planning bodies 
served the purposes for which they had been 
established. Later, when these initial conditions 
changed, these bodies gradually became less 
functional and, as a result, they also came to be of 
less importance in the countries' decision-
making processes. 
When the Latin American countries began 
to undertake planning, they hastily tended to 
imitate this type of institutional arrangement. 
This trend became even stronger during the 
period of the Alliance for Progress, when the 
truly important point was not so much to plan as 
to have a plan so that they could obtain the 
financing it offered. To this end, a body that 
would be expressly devoted to this task was 
needed, since the existing institutions in the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the State were 
assigned to specific and usually specialized func-
tions, and therefore lacked the holistic viewpoint 
required for comprehensive planning as well as, 
in general, the necessary know-how. Thus the 
idea gained sway of establishing a central, 
national body to be responsible for the manage-
ment of planning tasks; in practice, however, 
once this new type of body had been created, it 
was usually unable to achieve a satisfactory artic-
ulation with the other components of the State 
bureaucracy. One contributing factor to this 
problem was that, as the other public agencies 
came to perceive the sphere of duties assigned to 
the new institution as involving an appropria-
tion of functions which had previously been 
theirs, they embarked upon a determined strug-
gle to prevent this from happening. 
As a result of the discrepancy between the 
duties assigned to the central planning bodies at 
the time of their creation and those which they 
actually managed to call their own in the struggle 
for control over segments of the national 
decision-making process, in most cases a sharp 
separation of tasks began to emerge whereby 
design activities were divorced from implemen-
tation; in effect, while these bodies were primar-
ily engaged in establishing general guidelines for 
this process and translating them into compre-
hensive medium-range plans, the other institu-
tions of the public sector continued to perform 
their customary routine tasks of policy design 
and execution in their respective areas, and these 
functions were never wrested away from them. 
Under these circumstances, the central planning 
bodies were, for the most part, unable to gain a 
functional position within the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the State; nevertheless, most of 
them did manage to ensure their survival as 
organizations, albeit to the detriment of their 
influence on public policy decision-making; thus, 
in the long run, they were able to conduct only 
relatively insignificant activities from a political 
standpoint. 
In the light of this experience, it might well 
be asked whether this type of institutional arran-
gement for guiding and directing national plan-
ning processes on the basis of central bodies 
created expressly for the purpose is really a suita-
ble one for achieving a more satisfactory perfor-
mance of such tasks. An analysis of the current 
configuration of the State bureaucracy in Latin 
America (taking into account its historical roots 
and its respective process of formation, the 
results obtained by the various attempts to bring 
about administrative reform, and the actual 
experience gained since the 1960s in planning 
and in public policy design and execution) pro-
vides sufficient grounds for calling into question 
the appropriateness of this type of organization 
for the important functions that were assigned 
to it. In order for central planning bodies to be 
capable of performing these functions properly, 
it would appear that conditions would have to be 
conducive to a thorough-going structural reform 
of the Latin American government apparatus 
which would allow these bodies to be endowed 
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with the authorities and power required in order 
to orient and direct the respective planning pro-
cesses; this does not seem likely to occur given 
the situation as it now stands, however, and it 
would therefore be advisable to give some 
thought to more practical and flexible institu-
tional arrangements. 
In conclusion, the praxis which developed 
in various Latin American countries along the 
lines of this traditional concept of planning 
—even though it gave rise to intense activity as 
regards the formulation of comprehensive plans 
and the creation of central planning bodies— 
The results of what was done under the aegis of 
the traditional concept of planning in Latin 
America provide grounds for re-opçning ques-
tions such as the following: Is planning in capi-
talist social formations possible? and, if the 
answer is yes, then: Is planning in this type of 
national society necessary? 
In discussing these issues, it will be helpful 
to compare the results of the above experience 
with the results achieved in those cases where 
progress was made in carrying out the policy 
schemes of dominant social groups on the basis 
of a relatively consistent set of decisions and 
actions. In this connection, the recent history of 
the Latin American countries provides specific 
examples of the relatively successful execution of 
short-, medium- and long-term public policies 
whose design and implementation were based 
on the fundamental guidelines of the political 
scheme advocated by the agents having effective 
control at that point in time over national 
decision-making. The above statement is not 
intended to suggest, of course, that what 
occurred could be characterized as the imple-
mentation of immutable political blueprints, 
since in the course of the contradictory dynamics 
of the respective social processes, these schemes 
necessarily had to undergo many corrections and 
modifications during the period when they were 
does not seem to have had any major impact on 
policy. In fact, although this experience undoubt-
edly made a number of positive contributions to 
the Latin American countries concerned (foster-
ing a better understanding of the actual situa-
tions in the various countries, contributing to the 
modernization of the bureaucratic apparatus of 
the State, playing a-decisive role in the upgrading 
of national information systems, etc.), it is no 
less true that, from the standpoint of its impact 
on actual decision-making processes, its results 
were extremely limited in most cases. 
in effect as a consequence of their confrontation 
with the interests and demands of other social 
actors. 
Examples of experiences of this type are to 
be found prior to, during and after the above-
mentioned period of the political legitimation of 
planning. Among others, there have been the 
decision-making processes associated with the 
execution of such political schemes as those of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 
Mexico, the "Estado Novo" in Brazil and "bat-
llismo" in Uruguay. Despite any flaws and lim-
itations these processes may have had, when 
viewed from a long-term perspective each of 
them constitutes a concrete example of the fulfil-
ment, to a greater or lesser degree, of the main 
guidelines of a national political scheme pro-
moted by hegemonic social groups during the 
period in history when they held sway. As such, 
they can be classified as true instances of capital-
ist planning. 
Based solely on the evidence provided by an 
historical analysis, it can be stated that, even 
though the procedures and work methods used 
in these cases by no means conformed to the 
precepts of the orthodox school of Latin Ameri-
can planning (indeed, in many of these instan-
ces, the word "planning" was not even 
mentioned), their result was a public policy pro-
II 
The possibility and need for planning in 
Latin America 
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cess characterized by a reasonable degree of 
internal consistency, each of whose components 
was designed and implemented with a view to 
the basic objectives of the prevailing political 
scheme. The processes that were shaped in this 
way exhibited the basic.features of what is under-
stood as planning. 
In the final analysis, these processes 
—putting aside the messianic vision of planning 
referred to earlier— were based on a much more 
pragmatic and flexible concept. As such they 
appear to have conformed more closely to plan-
ning as we understand it within the environ-
ment of complex capitalist systems. In each of 
the cases mentioned, the methods that were 
selected proved to be reasonably appropriate to 
the characteristics of the decision-making pro-
cess in question, taking into account the prevail-
ing socio-political determinants in each case. 
Thus, for example, an analysis of experiences of 
this sort reveals that such procedures as negotia-
tion, as a means to social consensus, were often 
used when possible. By these and other means, 
an attempt was made to increase the political 
viability of the main components of the political 
scheme as a way of creating conditions that 
would be more conducive to its realization. 
Viewed thusiy, these experiences can be said to 
have been pioneering examples of strategic 
planning that were carried out using procedures 
which, in each case, were gradually refined as 
part of planning praxis. 
If this conclusion is accepted (which implies 
acceptance of the proposition that, under certain 
conditions, planning is possible in capitalist 
societies of the sort found in Latin America), 
then the next step is to address the issue of 
whether or not there is a need for planning in 
such societies. A number of situations and fac-
tors which are currently having a strong effect 
on these countries provide a basis for the 
hypothesis that it will surely become necessary, 
with ever-greater frequency, to have recourse to 
planning procedures and techniques in order to 
give direction to the development process of the 
respective national systems. Indeed, it may well 
be argued that, even when the governments of 
these countries might not wish to do so, there 
will be many reasons why they will be forced to 
resort to some type of planning in order to 
manage and control these processes properly. It 
should be noted that an ever-present tenet 
underlying the argument being presented here is 
the conviction that the free play of market forces 
is not capable of providing a satisfactory 
response to the problems arising in the contexts 
which will be examined in the following 
paragraphs. 
There are at least three factors or situations 
which, in the author's opinion, will henceforth 
make it necessary to resort to planning more and 
more often. The first is a result of the rapid and 
inexorable increase in the complexity of national 
systems which stems from the increasing diver-
sification of production and the constant evolu-
tion of their structures. This growing complexity 
has been making it increasingly difficult to 
deepen our understanding of the dynamics of 
these systems in their various dimensions and, 
consequently, to define actions which can offer a 
reasonable hope of producing the sought-fof 
modifications and refinements in these dynam-
ics. This situation cannot help but pose new and 
more difficult challenges for public manage-
ment, thus creating a need to'use suitable proce-
dures for or ien t ing and co-ordinat ing 
governmental actions and to ensure their consis-
tency with a view to maximizing the effective-
ness of the corresponding public policy 
packages. 
This trend towards greater complexity has, 
first and foremost, been reflected in the State 
apparatus itself. The characteristics of this pro-
cess and its implications in terms of public man-
agement were summarized by Bernardo 
Kliksberg in the following fashion: "The 
expanding Latin American State has been 
marked by a true explosion' of complexity. The 
scope of action of the public-sector apparatus has 
expanded considerably and its intervention in 
areas where it previously took action has become 
greater. The multitude of goals being pursued 
simultaneously poses difficult technical prob-
lems in relation to the compatibilization of 
objectives. At the same time, as it is faced with 
new responsibilities, the State has greatly diver-
sified its means of action. In most of the coun-
tries of the region, a wide range of means are 
used, including instruments of direct regulation, 
such as legal provisions, and instruments of indi-
rect regulation, such as the management of poli-
cies having a far-reaching effect on the economic 
structure {e.g., monetary, credit and fiscal poli-
cies, financial functions, industrial production, 
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marketing functions, etc.). The efficient man-
agement of this extensive array of heterogene-
ous operations with a view to maximizing 
objectives which, in turn, require constant atten-
tion in order to ensure their compatibility consti-
tutes an organizational problem of extreme 
complexity" (Kliksberg, 1984, p. 21). Planning, 
with the aid of its arsenal of methods and tech-
niques, appears to be the only suitable tool avail-
able for undertaking the task of efficiently 
managing the vast group of heterogeneous oper-
ations referred to by Kliksberg. 
Moreover, as the modernization and indus-
trialization of national systems progresses, a 
highly diversified and increasingly complex 
social pattern has been forming that is marked 
by a wide dispersion of power, all of which causes 
such societies to be more inclined towards social 
conflict. In this context, planning's forecasting 
methods can serve as useful aids to the functions 
of government, in that they can help to antici-
pate possible phases of social turmoil and thus 
furnish information needed for their control. 
The construction of future scenarios that include 
projections concerning the behaviour of the 
main social actors provides valuable input for 
the design of processes for attaining a social 
consensus which, in situations where power is 
dispersed, will open up suitable avenues for 
attempts to manage such social conflict. In supp-
lying a basis for tasks of this sort, planning 
becomes an effective tool for ensuring the pres-
ervation and stability of national institutions, 
which is one of the basic functions of national 
States in capitalist societies. 
In the same vein, the preparation of scena-
rios concerning the future evolution and possible 
positions of national systems furnishes back-
ground information which can be used to help 
lessen the uncertainty associated with decisions 
taken by the various types of social actors. This 
holds true both for those who are called upon to 
take political decisions that affect the system as a 
whole and for private-sector actors who thus 
gain information that may allow them to minim-
ize risks. Planning methods and techniques also 
serve as indispensable aids to governmental 
action in that they make it possible to confront 
the voluntarism of the national political schemes 
of hegemonic social groups with the results of 
socioeconomic projections, thereby providing 
information about how the political viability of 
alternative strategies might be increased. 
The second situation which, in this author's 
opinion, points up the need for planning is a 
consequence of the process of insertion of 
national units in an increasingly international-
ized system. This situation, which is reflected in 
the unceasing growth of linkages in the areas of 
finance, production, technology, consumption 
patterns, etc., between the systems of the 
periphery and those of the centre, has naturally 
given rise to an increase in national systems' 
vulnerability to external factors and decisions 
and, hence, to a gradual and irreversible reduc-
tion of their decision-making spaces. As they 
confront the problem of development within 
this context, the governments of the peripheral 
countries will need to know well ahead of time 
what the position and role of each national sys-
tem in its respective international context is 
going to be so that they will be able to choose 
avenues through which they can minimize the 
adverse impact of exogenous factors and deci-
sions. Using these types of projections as a basis, 
they will have to increase the co-ordination and 
effectiveness of their decisions in an attempt to 
produce consistent public policy packages that 
will allow them to maintain and, in so far as 
possible, expand their respective system's 
decision-making space. Herein lie the role and 
usefulness of planning as a tool to help deal with 
the consequences of the internationalization 
process in each national setting. 
The third factor is that planning appears to 
be an appropriate instrument for the peripheral 
countries to use in attempting to control and 
manage the impact of the so-called second indus-
trial revolution. This phenomenon, which is giv-
ing rise to revolutionary changes in science and 
technology (especially in microelectronics, 
microbiology and nuclear energy) may reach the 
point where it will have terribly adverse reper-
cussions on these countries. 
In a recent study on the implications of this 
phenomenon, Adam Schaff analysed its possible 
consequences for Third World countries: "What 
repercussions will the second industrial revolu-
tion have on these countries? ...the answer is not 
certain: the consequences of the present indus-
trial revolution may be disastrous or beneficial. 
In all probability, they will be both, and this is 
likely to mitígate the impending danger" 
(Schaff, 1985, p. 105). Despite the door which 
this statement appears to open, the author's 
subsequent analysis demonstrates that the reali-
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zation of many of its possible benefits will 
depend upon what the affected countries them-
selves are able to do. 
There is sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that, thus far, the interplay of market 
forces has not operated in a way favourable to 
these countries, and there are no convincing 
reasons to believe that this may change in the 
future. In order to control the impact of these 
revolutionary changes on the national systems of 
the periphery, it will be necessary to anticipate 
the future by attempting to determine, begin-
ning now, what each of these systems' mode of 
insertion in the emerging world context may be 
over the medium and long term. This task goes 
The fact that affirmative answers have been 
offered here in respect to the questions of the 
possibility and necessity of planning in capitalist 
countries may in some way seem to imply that 
planning decisions and actions have an unlim-
ited scope. Based on the conclusions drawn in the 
preceding section, the next step is therefore to 
consider the question of what is and what is not 
possible in these types of countries. 
In this connection, it is important to estab-
lish the fact that, fundamentally, the context of a 
planned process is always circumscribed by the 
influence of a series of factors which set certain 
limits of possibility^ in any given situation. 
These limits should not, however, be regarded as 
being rigid or immutable, since the ongoing con-
frontation among the interests and demands of 
various social actors which naturally arises dur-
ing the implementation of any political scheme 
continually generates contradictions that either 
expand or narrow the planning framework in 
each instance. Nevertheless, at each given point 
in time when decisions and actions are taken, 
this framework does have certain limits as to 
SA more detailed examination of the concept of limits of 
possibility in capitalist societies was undertaken in a previous work 
dealing with the subject of social action on a subnational scale (de 
Mattos, 1982). 
far beyond the scope and potentials of the rou-
tine, piecemeal management tasks carried out by 
various institutions in each country's govern-
ment service. In order to take decisions that will 
give these countries some chance of successfully 
confronting the consequences of this pheno-
menon, their governments will have to have the 
information that can be provided by projections 
concerning possible future scenarios. Such data 
can only be produced by using the methods and 
techniques now offered by planning, and the 
implementation of the resulting directives 
would appear to be possible only by means of its 
procedures. 
what can be done and what cannot, limits which 
must be taken into consideration if the corres-
ponding schemes are actually to arrive at a stage 
where they can be effectively executed. At least 
three types of factors must be considered in this 
regard. 
Firstly, in dealing with the processes which 
take place within capitalist countries, one factor 
that must be taken into account is that the actual 
viability of decisions and actions will be influ-
enced, above all, by the dominant rationality in 
this type of society, no matter what its specific 
and individual features may be. In other words, 
these processes are ultimately shaped by sequen-
ces of decisions and actions which are moulded 
and framed by the "rules of the game" of this 
dominant rationality. Certain definitive features 
of capitalist societies form a backdrop that 
always lies behind any type of decision; at the 
same time, these features also figure as poten-
tials and restrictions as regards each decision-
making process. The fact that a significant 
portion of the means of production are privately 
owned? the important role of the market in the 
allocation of resources and the determination of 
prices, and the impact of the maximization of 
profits as a central factor in economic calcula-
tions and, hence, in the behaviour of private-
III 
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sector agents are some of the elements that play 
a fundamental role in shaping the orientation 
and content of the processes of social action 
which are possible in this type of country. 
Ultimately, this type of influence —which 
relates to the definitive features of the social 
formation in question— constitutes the most 
rigicj factor in determining the range of possibil-
ity in any decision-making process that affects 
the system as. a whole; that is, this factor is the 
most difficult one of all to modify and the one 
most unlikely to be superceded. The State, as will 
be discussed later, plays a basic role, as a guardian 
of the society's cohesiveness, in seeing that the 
rules of the game are observed. 
The second factor refers to the orientation 
and content of the prevailing political scheme; as 
a concrete expression of the hegemonic social 
group's ideology, this scheme either explicitly or 
implicitly relates to the type of future society to 
which this group aspires. To use the words of 
Touraine: "To say that a society chooses its 
future is to say that it gives priority to selected 
options that are suited to the interests of a 
governing class, which may be more or less open 
or closed and more or less subject to certain types 
of institutional coercion. But this class is the one 
which defines, in the name of overall progress 
and of its own interests, the basic options" 
(A. Touraine, 1974, p. 172). At any given point 
in time, the decisions and actions involved in a 
planning process must be viewed in the context 
of the fundamental options referred to by Tou-
raine, and in accordance with them. Nonethe-
less, this sort of factor is more flexible than the 
first type mentioned inasmuch as the political 
scheme —because it is the sphere in which the 
outcomes of the struggle among the interests 
and demands of the various actors of civilian 
society are mainly expressed— never involves 
an immutable normative package; rather, at all 
times it is subject to modification, even while its 
essential content is preserved. In discussing this 
aspect, a major study on Latin American plan-
ning stated: "...if the political system operates 
through the medium of continuous and succes-
sive negotiations among various social sectors, 
then the prevailing political scheme becomes 
subject to changes in direction of varying signifi-
cance, although in such cases there is probably a 
more or less immutable fundamental basis or 
orientation to which adjustments of various 
types are made" (Solari, et al., 1980, p. 8). 
Obviously, when social confrontation produces a 
radical change in these essential features, then a 
different political scheme emerges which con-
forms to the ideology of a different social group 
and which is therefore directed towards a differ-
ent set of aspirations and intentions. 
Moreover, the State itself, as an arena for 
confrontation among the interests and demands 
of an array of social forces, is never entirely tied 
to an immutable political scheme; as Oszlak 
observed, "the State can no longer be regarded as 
a monolithic entity at the service of an invariable 
political scheme, but should rather be seen as an 
internally differentiated system in permanent 
flux which is affected, also differentially, by the 
demands and contradictions of civilian society" 
(Oszlak, 1980, p. 18). 
Despite such possible variations, so long as 
the contradictions generated during the imple-
mentation of the scheme do not result in its total 
elimination and its consequent replacement by a 
new scheme, the decisions and actions shaping 
the planning process will necessarily be influ-
enced by the orientation and basic content of this 
scheme. Viewed from another angle, the ideol-
ogy of the coalition of forces that is in power will 
be what determines which decisions can be taken 
and which cannot at each specific point in time. 
This therefore places additional limits on possi-
ble actions in a given planning process; conse-
quently, any proposed decision which goes 
beyond the limits established, either explicitly or 
implicitly, by the prevailing political scheme will 
be doomed to be no more than a dead letter. 
A complementary question is what the basic 
orientation and content of a political scheme 
might be under present conditions in a capitalist 
society. In very general terms, and taking into 
account the configuration of the power struc-
tures which have formed during the historical 
evolution of capitalism in the Latin American 
countries, the least that might be said in this 
regard is that the political schemes supported by 
these power structures will tend to be particu-
larly sensitive to the ideology and interests of the 
economically dominant social groups within the 
context for which they are formulated. This 
framework was largely ignored by traditional 
planning theory in Latin America, and this is 
what allowed it to postulate, without any serious 
objection being raised, the fiction of a type of 
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planning which served to further developmen-
talist social change and to idealize the figure of 
the planner as a relatively autonomous agent of 
such change; this is also what led to the assump-
tion that it was possible to bring about sweeping 
processes of social change by and through the 
government by means of planning. 
In reference to this same question, it is also 
important to determine the nature of the role 
played by the bureaucratic apparatus of the State. 
Oszlak stressed that "the bureaucracy is not 
merely a tool of those who exercise the power of 
the State" (Oszlak, 1979, p. 238) and drew atten-
tion to three basic roles which are customarily 
assumed by the State bureaucracy: "1) a sectoral 
role, in which it acts as if it had 'broken off* from 
the State and serves to represent its own inter-
ests as a sector vis-a-vis the State; 2) a mediating 
role, in which it expresses, adds, neutralizes or 
promotes interests on behalf of economically 
dominant sectors; and 3) an infrastructural role, 
in which it provides the know-how and effort 
required to achieve ends of general interest, 
which are usually expressed in the formal objec-
tives of the State {idem, p. 239). Obviously, any 
analysis attempting to identify the substantive 
characteristics of the decision-making processes 
occurring in capitalist social formations cannot 
fail to stress the mediating role of the bureau-
cracy, in which it, "appealing to the general 
interest and shrouded in its legitimizing aura ... 
is biased in favour of the satisfaction of the 
interests of the economically dominant lasses" 
(idem, p. 239). 
Ultimately, any decision-making process 
involving the two types of influence considered 
thus far (i.e., the dominant rationality of the 
system and the ideology of hegemonic social 
groups) will tend to consolidate its nature as a 
reproducer —and, hence, as a conservator in the 
strict sense of the word— of the definitive fea-
tures of that social formation. Whether we like it 
or not, planning invariably tends to perform this 
function of reproduction and conservation in 
both capitalist and socialist societies of the types 
known in the world so far. 
A third kind of influence, which is actually 
inherent in the two already mentioned, relates to 
the fact that the external framework to which 
national systems are linked also places definite 
and inescapable restrictions on decision-making 
in such systems. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it 
is impossible to ignore the fact that with each 
passing day these systems are more and more 
clearly becoming parts of a supranational system i 
and that increasingly strong production, finan-
cial, technological and other linkages are form-
ing systemic nexus which narrow the scope of 
decision-making in each national milieu. 
As in any type of system, the parts are 
sharply constrained by the dynamics of the 
whole, especially in the case of the weaker 
and/or more dependent components. This 
means that the possibilities for action in each 
national system are also affected by the domi-
nant rationality of the world system to which 
they are linked. As a result, at this level, too, it 
must be remembered that there are "rules of the 
game" which set limits on what can and what 
cannot be done; indeed, it may even be observed 
that the international community itself has grad-
ually been establishing arbiters whose mission it 
is to ensure that each national component abides 
by these rules as much as possible. 
In summary, the three aspects considered in 
this discussion play a part in determining and 
consolidating concrete limits on the definition of 
the content and possible scope of planning pro-
cesses within capitalist economies. As a corol-
lary, it therefore seems entirely justified to assert 
that so long as the definitive features of the 
system do not change, the effect of the above-
mentioned factors must be considered when 
identifying, designing and proposing the poli-
cies of this process; only thus is it possible for 
proposed strategies and actions to have a reaso-
nable degree of viability and, consequently, for 
effective planning processes to be conducted. 
The situation as it has been outlined here 
might seem highly restrictive and appear to sup-
port an overly pessimistic and ÍmmobüÍst view 
of change and, hence, of the prospects for an 
improvement in the social conditions now pre-
vailing in the countries of the region. However, 
the nature of social system dynamics indicates 
that the possibility of bringing about change is 
generally greater than might be expected. As 
noted before, in each specific case and at each 
point in history, the contradictions generated by 
the implementation of the prevailing political 
schemes tend to open up opportunities for the 
emergence of other political schemes with dif-
ferent orientations and contents and to heighten 
the social struggle surrounding them. 
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IV 
The necessary conditions for a successful 
planning process 
As suggested earlier, planning is basically a 
procedure for achieving consistency in decision-
making processes with a view to ensuring the 
required level of co-ordination among the activi-
ties that are directed towards the fullest possible 
attainment of the main objectives of a political 
scheme. Nevertheless, although the fact that 
planning is done may increase the likelihood of 
success, it obviously does not ensure ít. In other 
words, in each specific case, a whole range of 
factors are at work which cause the respective 
processes to have a greater or lesser chance of 
success. The factors which, in this author's opin-
ion, have the greatest impact on the successful-
ness of such a process are discussed below. 
Firstly, one type of condition for success is 
associated with the limits of possibility affecting 
the decisions and actions involved in each given 
process. The foregoing considerations indicate 
that, in order for a planning process to have a 
likelihood of success, the political scheme that is 
its basis must have been designed within the 
framework of the limits of possibility in the 
respective system. 
Despite the apparent obviousness of this 
statement, an analysis of the reasons for the 
interruption of many such processes in Latin 
America that have been inspired by forward-
looking policies suggests that the main cause was 
that the basic lines of the political scheme in 
question had exceeded the bounds of the sys-
tem's dominant rationality. This can clearly be 
seen in a number of cases where political 
schemes proposed revolutionary changes, inas-
much as they sought to advance beyond what was 
permitted by the prevailing rules of the game. 
Their inviability became apparent sooner rather 
than later because one or more of the definitive 
features of the system ultimately prevailed; at 
that moment, the presence of the State made 
itself felt as the State asserted its role as a factor 
working to preserve the cohesiveness of the 
society in question and successfully ensured the 
continued reproduction of this social formation. 
If we accept the proposition that, as O'Don-
nell puts it, "the State or political activity as such 
simultaneously guarantees the capitalist rela-
tions of production, the articulation of classes in 
society, the systematic differentiation of access 
to power (or system of domination), and the 
generation and reproduction of capital" (O'Don-
nell, 1978, p. 1167), we gain some idea of the 
scope of the State's role as an arbiter whose 
function is to preserve the "rules of the game" 
and to reproduce the basic features of a capitalist 
social formation. The recent history of Latin 
America provides abundant empirical evidence 
in support of this assertion. 
Secondly, in order to increase the likelihood 
of a planning process' success, i.e., in order for 
the set of public policies which shape this pro-
cess to permit the basic objectives of the corres-
ponding political scheme to be more fully 
attained, the social groups in power must be 
truly hegemonic; to express this idea in terms of 
Gramscian analysis, whether through the pre-
dominance of the functions of political direction 
(consensus) or of domination (coercion), these 
groups must have an effective capacity to take 
the required decisions and actions in order to 
progress towards the achievement of the objec-
tives being pursued. In other words, this means 
that the groups exercising the functions of 
government must have an effective capacity to 
govern.4 If they do not, it would be difficult to 
initiate a real planning process, much less one 
having any reasonable hope of success. 
In addition to the capacity to govern, how-
ever, both the basic normative guidelines that 
are proposed and the policies decided upon for 
their implementation must have the necessary 
4Gurrien has clearly defined the scope of this concept; he 
stated that the capacity to govern "manifests itself in three 
spheres: a) the Style apparatus' technical, administrative and 
managerial efficiency and effectiveness, which are important 
aspects in the individual performance of each one of its units and ¡n 
the articulation of the whole; b) the political capacity to unite the 
wills of many and to organize society, especially through the 
articulation of the government and the State apparatus with social 
agents; c) the economic and financial capacity to further, to stimu-
late and to guide the process of change" (Gurrieri, 1986). 
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permanence and continuity to permit the matu-
ration and consolidation of the changes advo-
cated by the political scheme in question. The 
planning process can have a good chance of 
success only if the political scheme's basic guide-
lines and the corresponding policies are main-
tained over a suitably long period of time. The 
experiences of the PRI in Mexico and of "bat-
llismo" in Uruguay are good examples in this 
respect. 
A third condition, which is complementary 
to the one just discussed, is the need for an 
adequate degree of compenetration and accep-
tance of the basic lines of the political scheme 
that is to be promoted by the State bureaucracy. 
In view of the constraints usually affecting action 
by the State bureaucracy and the roles it plays 
(Oszlak, 1979), if the political scheme does not 
enjoy the necessary degree of acceptance at this 
level, it would seem unlikely that acceptable pro-
gress towards its implementation can be 
achieved. In addition, however, the State bureau-
cracy must have an adequate implementation 
capability, especially in cases where the political 
scheme provides for major changes and altera-
tions in the prevailing situation. 
Finally, a fourth aspect which constitutes an 
important condition for the success of a plan-
ning experience is that the causal connections 
adopted as the basis for identifying and recom-
mending given actions must be compatible with 
the laws of realistic change. In the final analysis, 
any proposal for action ¡s founded on the theo-
retical assumption that if "A" is done, there can 
be a reasonable presumption that "B" will occur. 
Nonetheless, it is a recognized fact that the social 
sciences do not offer us any theories that permit 
us to comprehend how a national system as a 
whole functions in all its complexity. On the 
contrary, social theories are at present made up 
of proposals having a highly ideological content 
and, in essence, they provide no more than frag-
mentary inputs, in that they relate to parts or 
dimensions (economic, social, political, etc.) of 
the system. Consequently, each time a social 
agent chooses a given causal connection as a 
foundation for decisions and actions, the agent is 
in fact making a selection that is based on ideo-
logical factors, and the only elements among 
which the agent can choose are partial or frag-
mentary explanations. 
The implications of this statement can be 
illustrated with an example taken from the the-
ory of development and regional planning. In 
this field, two contradictory explanations are to 
be found for the same phenomenon, namely, 
that of regional disequilibria. On the one hand, 
neoclassical theory argues, in essence, that in a 
situation where market forces are free to work 
and where no restrictions are placed on the 
internal movement of factors, interregional 
income inequalities originating in an initial dis-
parity in resource endowments will tend to be 
reduced. The policy implications of this argu-
ment are obvious. On the other hand, Myrdal 
asserts that: "the main idea which I wish to get 
across is that the interplay of market forces usu-
ally tends to increase, rather than decrease, 
inequalities among regions" (Myrdal, 1958, 
p. 38). This statement's implications for policy-
making are patently contrary to those of the 
neoclassical explanation. Clearly, both cannot be 
correct. Nevertheless, as shown by Latin Ameri-
ca's recent experiences, both explanations have 
been chosen as a basis for action, thus giving rise 
to opposed and contradictory decisions and 
actions in different countries. 
It would appear relevant at this point in the 
discussion to consider the meaning and scope of 
the concept of "bounded rationality" introduced 
by Herbert Simon in his studies on the behaviour 
of organizations. According to O'Donnell's 
interpretation (1978, p. 1176), this bounded 
rationality is to be observed in the following 
form: "...whether or not they are placed at the 
apex of the institutional system of the State, 
human beings are subject to severe cognitive 
limitations relating to their own shortcomings 
and to the multidimensionality of society. This 
means that theirs is a 'bounded rationality': in 
other words, they cannot really seek or find 
optimal solutions. Their attention span is 
limited, the number of problems they can deal 
with is small, their search for information 
involves increasing costs, the criteria guiding 
such searches are biased by unconscious factors 
and operational routines, and information is far 
from free-flowing. Consequently, the typical 
method of decision-making is by trial and error, 
based on the discovery of suboptimal (merely 
'satisfactory') solutions which presuppose a rud-
imentary theory of the causal connections that 
govern the problems they seek to solve". Given 
that, in the increasingly complex societies in 
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which we live, these are the conditions under 
which decisions must be taken, it is to be con-
cluded that, depending upon the degree of accu-
racy of the causal connections chosen as a basis 
for the social process of decision-making and 
action, in the best of cases the most that can be 
hoped for is some approximation of the results 
sought. 
In short, no matter how consistent decisions 
may be, no matter how well co-ordinated the 
actions taken, no matter how strong the capacity 
to govern, and no matter how great the com-
penetration and acceptance of what is to be done 
The considerations examined thus far tend to 
support the conclusion that a more pragmatic 
and measured attitude should be taken to the 
modality, role and prospects of planning when 
contemplating its possible application to situa-
tions such as those found in the countries of 
Latin America. Everything seems to indicate 
that the time when a planning problem could be 
approached as some type of exercise in science 
fiction has now passed. Nevertheless, there is 
good reason to think that some type of planning 
will be necessary for the management and con-
trol of the national systems of the periphery, 
especially since they are in the midst of a situa-
tion which will surely tend to become more and 
more adverse with each passing day. Given these 
considerations, it is fitting to explore the ques-
tion of what type of planning is possible now. 
This question is particularly relevant in 
view of the fact that during the past few years 
—surely as a consequence of the frustration 
caused by the results it has produced in 
practice— a marked revival has taken place in 
the generation of proposals for new planning 
modalities and procedures. Despite their appar-
ent novelty, however, most of these proposals 
can still be readily identified with the general 
approach put forth by Faludi more than a decade 
ago (Faludi, 1973). The review prepared by 
by the State bureaucracy, if the causal connec-
tions that are selected are not compatible (and, 
in fact, they never are entirely so) with the real 
dynamics of change of social systems, the results 
obtained can never approximate those that were 
sought. Under these conditions, it must be con-
cluded that uncertainty continues to be an inher-
ent feature of any process of decision-making 
and action within the context of complex social 
systems and that, in the final analysis, many of 
them can only be carried out on the basis of 
carefully-conducted exercises of trial and error. 
This brings us back to the statement made by 
Habermas cited at the beginning of this article. 
Bromley sheds a great deal of light on this matter 
(Bromley, 1983); in this work, he listed and 
analysed a wide range of planning modalities 
which are now under discussion in Latin Amer-
ica. The proposals he mentioned cover a vast 
spectrum, ranging from concepts in which the 
idea of anticipating the future is virtually absent 
due to their heavy emphasis on a "day-to-day" 
perspective, to those which, because of their 
excessive utopianism, are of little use in dealing 
with the plethora of current problems within the 
framework of the very real conditions in capital-
ist social formations. In many, we can see the 
reappearance of the old vice of Utopian volunta-
rism, while others mark the emergence of new 
formalistic rituals. Neither the one nor the 
other, as Bromley observed, appears to offer 
productive options for application in cases such 
as those of the Latin American countries. 
It is very likely that the type of planning 
which can actually be practiced during the com-
ing years will be a pragmatic combination of the 
"two types of planning capacity" identified by 
Van Arkadie in a recent paper: on the one hand, 
there is a "routine planning capacity", which 
refers to the capability for planning and control-
ling the execution of projects and programmes 
as it has traditionally been conducted by the 
various specialized agencies of the State (agricul-
V 
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ture, industry, public works, energy, health, edu-
cation, social security, etc.); on the other hand, 
there is a "strategic planning capacity", which 
includes "a relatively limited range of tasks that 
are identified as requiring the attention of 
policy-makers at the highest level" (Van Arka-
die, 1986, p. 8). If this proposition is accepted, 
the implication is that a planning modality will 
be being adopted which, essentially, tends to 
reproduce the method of work that was in fact 
utilized in many of the relatively successful capi-
talist planning experiences referred to earlier, 
albeit with refinements which may be deemed 
advisable as a result of advances in our under-
standing of these processes and of the lessons to 
be learned from planning praxis as such. 
Routine planning decisions and activities 
are part of the customary duties of the public 
agencies which came into being and developed in 
response to the appearance of new problems and 
the opening of new fronts of action as a result of 
the increasing diversification of production in 
the various countries. Originally, the tendency 
was to conduct these activities on the basis of 
extremely fragmentary and disconnected pro-
cesses; in most cases, this modality continued 
even during the "boom" of traditional planning 
in the period of the Alliance for Progress. Hence, 
even though policy co-ordination was one of its 
main functions, traditional planning did not 
manage to gain effective control over the routine 
activities of the State. 
Nonetheless, it is also true that during the 
past few decades the efforts made to modernize 
and rationalize government service in a number 
of countries, in combination with the concerns 
which have arisen out of a better understanding 
of the structural interdependence of the parts of 
the system, have to some degree brought about a 
de-feudalization of the national subprocesses of 
decision-making. Consequently, there has been a 
tendency to gradually channel routine decisions 
and actions into more consistent frameworks. 
These have primarily been established in areas 
relating to the allocation of financial resources 
through directives issued by the agencies in 
charge of managing the public treasury and/or 
budget. Thus, even if it is still in a somewhat 
rudimentary form, a more effective co-
ordination of routine activities is being achieved; 
to the extent that this is being done, it becomes 
possible to speak of a greater degree of planning 
at this level. 
Even though it does not, for the time being, 
appear reasonable to think about the possibility 
of making radical changes in the structure which 
originates routine decisions and measures, it is 
logical to think about gradually achieving a 
greater co-ordination of decision-making at this 
level within the framework of the normative 
guidelines of existing political schemes. 
Strategic decisions and actions, on the other 
hand, concern aspects of central importance in 
political schemes whose fulfilment is seen as 
being essential in order to ensure the schemes' 
continuation and their more effective imple-
mentation. The justification for emphasizing 
these aspects was quite clearly stated by Van 
Arkadie when he said that: "in the real world of 
politics, it is precisely by concentrating attention 
on a limited programme that a government 
gains a chance of having some impact upon 
economic events. Focusing attention on what is 
actually important is the way to make effective 
use of the government's scarce political resour-
ces" (Van Arkadie, 1986, p. 9). Perhaps the only 
additional comment that need be made in regard 
to this assertion is that, ¡n practice, strategic 
actions have an impact on both economic and 
non-economic aspects. 
At this level, selectivity and prioritization 
are essential. When power is dispersed and 
when, as underscored by Van Arkadie, the scar-
city of governmental political resources is a 
widespread phenomenon, efforts absolutely 
must be concentrated on those aspects which are 
of fundamental importance in ensuring that pro-
gress is made towards implementing the politi-
cal scheme. In discussing some approaches to a 
renewal of administrative reform, Kliksberg 
makes an assertion along the same lines: "patt-
erns of reasoning oriented towards the careful 
selection of priorities must be integrated into a 
conceptual framework. An effort must be made 
to determine those types of problems which are 
of the greatest strategic significance in relation 
to major national goals, which can have a mul-
tiplier effect within the government apparatus, 
and whose attack is feasible. The search for 'easy' 
solutions should be supplanted by a rigorous 
selection of integral problem areas whose modi-
fication is essential to the overall development 
effort" (Kliksberg, 1984, p. 48). 
This is the proper level for any actions sug-
gested by an analysis of possible future scenarios 
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whose purpose would be to seek a better position 
for these countries in terms of the problems 
posed by their growing articulation with an ever-
more interdependent world system and by the 
revolution in science and technology. It will 
primarily be through strategic action that a repo-
sitioning of these countries within an increas-
ingly adverse context can be achieved. 
Obviously, the approach to planning tasks 
which has been outlined here does not reflect the 
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more ambitious contributions recently being 
made in the field of planning modalities. Never-
theless, it is this author's opinion that under the 
prevailing conditions in the Latin American 
countries, this is an appropriate —and, to a 
point, proven— way of addressing the problems 
of orienting, governing and ensuring the consis-
tency of the sequence of actions decided upon by 
actors having political control over decision-
making with a view to the fulfilment of the basic 
guidelines of their political scheme. 
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